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Abstract
Why the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Received Force
against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) will not work—whereas the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities may.
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On my way to boarding the plane headed for Geneva for
purposes of participating in the UNIDIR Conference on
Space Security, April 2-3, 2013,1 I was once more reminded
by several notices that I was not allowed to take, inter alia,
any knife with me into the aircraft. Mind you: not just knives
specially produced or converted to wound or kill people, but
any knife, including knives specially produced or converted for example to cut bread—because, obviously, also those
could wound or kill people on an aircraft, and there would
be little upfront guarantee about absence of malicious intent
on my part to use any knife for such purposes.
This is essentially also why, upon closer view, the RussoChinese proposal for a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use
of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT),2 which was
first put on the table on 2008 in the Conference on Disarmament, will not work—whereas the EU-initiated, and by now
inter alia US-supported, Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities,3 proposed in its first version in the same year of
2008, from that same vantage point may be successful. Both
were also revisited at the aforementioned UNIDIR Conference as major elements of the long-standing, but still current

--------------------

1
See http://swfound.org/news/all-news/swf-successfully-co-organizesthe2013-unidir-space-conference/ for further details on the conference.
2
Draft PPWT, or Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects;
presented February 12, 2008 to the Conference on Disarmament; e.g. http://
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/parosindex.html (click on the treaty’s comprehensive name).
3
See for the text revised as of 2010, Annex, Conclusions adopted by the
Council on September 27, 2010; Council of the European Union, Doc. 14455/10
of October 11, 2010; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/
st14455.en10.pdf.

discussion on ‘deweaponization’ and/or the prevention of
an arms race in outer space (and more often than not presented as mutually exclusive alternatives).
While laudable as an effort to help preserve the realm of
outer space, so far not having experienced any use of armed
force in the classical meaning of the word, for peaceful purposes, the draft PPWT from a legal perspective has one major flaw which will inevitably cause it to remain a dead letter. This does not refer to the (more politically-oriented)
debate on whether ‘weapons in space’ are really the most
threatening issue to be addressed or whether ‘space debris’
and other modes of interference with space activities are actually more important. Nor does it refer, as such, to the (essentially political) debate on whether a legally binding treaty or a ‘soft-law’ instrument, legally nonbinding but perhaps politically-binding, would be preferable.4
The legal flaw of the draft PPWT by contrast resides in
the inability to properly define the core notion of ‘weapon,’ in particular in the context of outer space where most,
if not all hardware, software and activities are of a dual-use
character. ‘Dual-use’ is taken to mean here that they can
be used both for military, including aggressive, and nonmilitary, including commercial purposes, without much
further conversion or redesign. If one is going to realize a
‘hard-law’ treaty obligation for most or all important space
powers not to put any weapons in outer space, however, a
clear-cut and indisputable definition of that concept would
be indispensable.

--------------------

4
Cf. on these issues I. Marboe (editor), Soft Law in Outer Space—The Function of Non-Binding Norms in International Space Law (2012).
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Here, experience has shown that it is very hard already in
terrestrial realms to define such a broad concept as ‘weapon’ with any acceptable level of precision, thus essentially
precluding any global agreement on prohibiting them. Only
where focused on special types of weapons have international treaties on banning them, including their testing and stockpiling, achieved a measure of success. This applies to such
narrowly defined and easily-delineated categories as nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, cluster
munitions and landmines.5
However, as soon as slightly broader categories came to be
used in such a context, relevant efforts were doomed to run
into trouble. The most prominent example in the context of
outer space concerns the reference to ‘weapons of mass destruction’ as it is amongst others found in Article IV of the
1967 Outer Space Treaty.6 While presumably clear in combining nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as soon as
in the 1980s US plans were developed to build a space defense infrastructure (the Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI)
based on the use of laser weapons, the dispute on whether
such weapons were also included in the concept of ‘weapons
of mass destruction’ reared its head e and was never satisfactorily solved. (It was the simple unilateral cancellation of the

--------------------

5
Cf., e.g., Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, New York, done September 24,
1996, not yet entered into force; Cm. 3665; 35 ILM 1439 (1996); Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Mexico City, done February 14, 1967, entered into force September 20, 1967; 634 UNTS 281; 6 ILM 521
(1967); South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Rarotonga, done August 6,
1985, entered into force December 11, 1986; 1445 UNTS 177; ATS 1986 No. 32;
24 ILM 1440 (1985); Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, London/Moscow/Washington, done
February 11, 1971, entered into force May 18, 1972; 955 UNTS 115; TIAS No.
7337; 23 UST 701; UKTS 1973 No. 13; Cmnd. 4678; ATS 1973 No. 4; 10 ILM
145 (1971); S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-28 (1997); Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction (hereafter Chemical Weapons Convention), New York,
done September 3, 1992, entered into force April 29, 1997; 1974 UNTS 45; S.
Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, London/Moscow/Washington, done April 10,
1972, entered into force March 26, 1975; 26 UST 583; 11 UKTS, Cmd. 6397;
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling,
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (hereafter Chemical Weapons Convention), New York, done September 3, 1992, entered into
force April 29, 1997; 1974 UNTS 45; S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21; and Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, done October 10, 1980, entered into force 2 December
1983; 1342 UNTS 7.
6
Art. IV, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(Outer Space Treaty), London/Moscow/Washington, done January 27, 1967,
entered into force October 10, 1967; 610 UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410;
UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967); provides
in relevant part: “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”
7
See for example the indictments against Zacarias Moussaoui as a co-conspirator in the 9/11 attacks by a federal grand jury in United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia inter alia on a federal charge of “conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction” with reference to “weapons of
mass destruction, namely, airplanes intended for use as missiles;” UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA -v- ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI,
a/k/a “Shaqil,”
a/k/a “Abu Khalid al Sahrawi,” Defendant; Count Four, at 2; http://www.
justice.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm.
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program before becoming a physical reality, which turned
the debate into a moot one.) And with the 9/11 attacks, a
similar question arose in adjacent legal realms as to whether aircraft could not also, under circumstances, constitute
‘weapons of mass destruction.’7
Following a first wave of criticism on the handling of this
definitional problem, the draft PPWT undertook an effort to
refine the concept of ‘weapon’ by referring to ‘special production or conversion’ to serve as a weapon, as the crucial
distinguishing line between hardware to be prohibited and
hardware not to be prohibited in outer space.8 However, if
already in the case of a simple knife it is not considered feasible to distinguish, from a security perspective, between
knives specially produced or converted for wounding and
killing respectively for cutting bread, how could one make
that distinction work in the context of outer space and hardware launched into it, being so far away from inspection and
monitoring opportunities as well as being of such a complicated high-technology nature?
Not accidentally therefore also in terrestrial realms, apart
from the limited set of treaties referred to above prohibiting
narrowly defined and relatively easily-distinguishable types
of weapons, efforts to establish, maintain and/or enhance international and national security by legal means have been
largely channeled not through prohibiting the hardware involved, but through prohibiting their use other than in a set of narrowly defined circumstances.
Thus, in terms of threat or use of force against the integrity
of another state—always at the heart of the international and
national security debates—only two main exceptions have
been recognized to the baseline prohibition thereof by Article
2(4) of the UN Charter.9 One concerns the notion of self-defense, individually or collectively, provided by Article 51 of
the UN Charter.10 The other concerns the customary practice

--------------------

8
Art. I(c), PPWT, defines ‘weapons in outer space’ as “any device placed in
outer space, based on any physical principle, specially produced or converted
to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function of objects in outer space, on
the Earth or in its air, as well as to eliminate population, components of biosphere critical to human existence or inflict damage to them;” emphasis added.
9
Art. 2(4), Charter of the United Nations (hereafter UN Charter), San Francisco, done 26 June 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945; USTS 993; 24 UST
2225; 59 Stat. 1031; 145 UKTS 805; UKTS 1946 No. 67; Cmd. 6666 & 6711; CTS
1945 No. 7; ATS 1945 No. 1; provides: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
10
Art. 51, UN Charter, states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
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which has grown out of the UN Charter context, notably Article 42, to mandate—within specific limits asserted by UN
Resolutions—the use of force against states officially determined to present major threats to international peace and security by the UN Security Council.11
Without going into a detailed discussion of the proper legal parameters, perhaps even validity, thereof, it may be further posited that there are—at best—two further areas where
the threat or use of force may be legally acceptable. One concerns a right of self-defense beyond the somewhat limited version thereof contained in the UN Charter, as a right under
customary international law.12 Here, however, immediately
further limitations as to proportionality and necessity should
serve to minimize the possible abuse of such a justification
for undue purposes. Those same parameters should also be
deemed to apply to other presumably allowable measures
of force, as ‘reprisals’ where not the integrity of a state could
be argued to be at stake but ‘merely’ important security and
other national interests, such as in the case of destruction of a
satellite providing important services.
Again without going into a discussion into the specific parameters (Is preventive self-defense allowable? The use of
force for humanitarian purposes even if not mandated by the
United Nations? To what extent does economic and political pressure amount to a ‘threat or use of force’?) it should
be pointed out here that general public international law and
more specifically the UN Charter are also considered applicable to outer space and space activities by virtue of Article
III of the Outer Space Treaty.13
As Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, the only article in
the classic UN space treaties directly dealing with the military use of outer space, provides for a few rather general
parameters only, there is no reason to consider the above-

--------------------

11
Art. 42, UN Charter, provides that “the Security Council (…) may take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of
the United Nations.” On the basis of this clause, in particular the international, US-led military operations against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (first for invading Kuwait, much later on the unjustified claims Iraq’s development of weapons of mass destruction had reached a critical phase) and Afghanistan (following 9/11) were initiated.
12
Note already that the aforementioned Art. 51, UN Charter, refers to ‘not
impairing’ ‘the inherent right’ of self-defense.
13
Art. III, Outer Space Treaty, provides that “States Parties to the Treaty
shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding.”
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mentioned generic prohibition on the threat or use of force
and the four possible exceptions thereto to not apply in outer space as well.
It is for this reason finally that the Code of Conduct—by
contrast to the draft PPWT—has a fair chance of success as
it essentially builds upon the successes of, and experience
with general international law in the realm of international
and national security. Satellites, from the above perspective,
are mankind’s knives in outer space: capable of both causing
horrible death and destruction and providing essential services for humanity.
Prohibiting all weapons—as is the case on aircraft—in outer space would essentially cause space activities to come to
a screeching halt, and for that reason alone would be politically utopian. But distinguishing between hardware specially produced or converted for causing damage and hardware
not so produced or converted, as the draft PPWT now does,
is an artificial distinction which not only is extremely difficult to monitor in practice, but already in theory makes little sense: a knife ‘produced’ for cutting bread does not even
need to be ‘converted’ to be instantly used for the purpose of
wounding or killing someone.
In building upon the approach to address behavior rather
than hardware in outer space, the Code of Conduct by contrast provides more specific limitations and more precise parameters to any allowable threats to space activities in themselves as well as threats to earth from outer space, which includes the threats or use of force in outer space. Whilst its (at
least initial) non-binding nature may be deplored by many as
contrasted with the benefit of having a treaty of binding nature such as aimed for by the draft PPWT, the lack of likelihood of that draft being successful should not allow the best
to become the enemy of the good.

